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This article constructs indicators of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) for 18 British 
manufacturing industries for the years 1880, 1890, and 1900. The indicators constitute the 
earliest systematic estimates of the relative performance of British industries. The indicators 
are then employed in a four-factor Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade, with the factors being 
capital, labour, material inputs, and human capital. Contrary to previous literature, the 
manufacturing comparative advantages of late-Victorian Britain were not in the relatively 
labour-intensive industries. By 1890, there was a distinctly labour-economizing regime 
within British manufacturing. Contributing to this pattern of within-sector specialization were 
emigration from Britain and the full absorption of displaced agricultural labour into the 
manufacturing sector. This article concludes with the suggestion that, in the late-Victorian 
era, British and American manufacturing were not so dissimilar, at least relative to 
Continental manufacturing. 
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Economic historians have generally understood that ‘the industries of the Industrial 
Revolution retained their comparative advantage until the First World War’ (Harley 2014, p. 
6). Indeed, the staple industries of textiles and iron continued to dominate the composition of 
British exports through the late-Victorian era. 1  However, there remains the question of 
whether Britain realized comparative advantages in the many other industries that 
characterized its manufacturing sector and, increasingly, the manufacturing sectors (and 
exports) of other industrial countries. Accordingly, this article contributes to the existing 
literature by constructing indicators of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) for 18 British 
manufacturing industries for the years 1880, 1890, and 1900.  
The RCA indicators constructed in this article represent the earliest systematic 
measurements of the relative performance of individual British manufacturing industries. 
Broadberry’s (1997, pp. 28-32) industry-disaggregated estimates of comparative labour 
productivity begin in 1907, when output data for the manufacturing sector becomes available 
                                                     
1 The staple industries of textiles and iron accounted for fully 66% of Britain’s manufactured 
exports in 1902-4 (Schlote, 1952, p. 74). 
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in the First Census of Production. For the late nineteenth century, an absence of standardized 
output data across the range of industries precludes any industry-disaggregated estimation of 
comparative labour productivity. Consequently, Broadberry’s analysis of the relative 
performance of Britain’s manufacturing industries, vis-à-vis those of the United States and 
Germany, was dependent upon a broad range of secondary sources. Nevertheless, the high-
quality trade data available for industrial countries in the late nineteenth century permit the 
construction of RCA indicators, which can cautiously be approached as a quantitative 
complement to Broadberry’s analysis of Britain’s manufacturing industries in the pre-1907 
period. Of course, comparative advantage is not the same as comparative labour productivity; 
as Broadberry (1997, p. 158) observed, ‘Clearly, there is no one-to-one mapping between 
variations in comparative labour productivity and comparative advantage, since labour is not 
the only factor of production’. Still, there is an historically close correspondence between 
comparative labour productivity and comparative advantage, and areas of particular strength 
and weakness in Britain’s manufacturing sector should be apparent from both measures.2 
In this article, the RCA indicators are extended into the debate over the factor pattern of 
Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages. Crafts and Thomas (1986, p. 637) argued 
that the manufacturing comparative advantages of late-Victorian Britain rested in the 
relatively labour-intensive industries. Their argument is difficult to reconcile with the 
historically lower wages that prevailed in Continental Europe, which supplied 52% of world 
manufactured exports in 1899 (calculated from Tyszynski, 1951, p. 277). The novel finding 
of this article is that the manufacturing comparative advantages of late-Victorian Britain were 
in the relatively labour-economizing industries, not the relatively labour-intensive industries 
as Crafts and Thomas have argued. Whereas Crafts and Thomas relied upon (non-
                                                     
2 For example, in the 1930s, Britain tended to realize comparative advantages and lesser gaps 
in labour productivity (relative to the United States) in light manufacturing industries (Broadberry and 
Crafts, 1992, p. 542). 
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normalized) gross British exports for the year 1880 as a proxy for comparative advantage, 
this article relies upon purposely constructed RCA indicators following a modified version of 
the Balassa (1965) method. The labour-economizing factor pattern of late-Victorian Britain’s 
manufacturing comparative advantages, identified in this article, renders British 
manufacturing closer to American manufacturing than might have been assumed from a 
canonical literature—the classic contribution is Habakkuk (1962)—stressing Anglo-
American differences in nineteenth-century manufacturing.3  
This article also enables an understanding of the longer-term development of Britain’s 
manufacturing comparative advantages throughout the nineteenth century, which began with 
Britain’s Industrial Revolution and ended with foreign industrialization. To be sure, the 
closing decades of the nineteenth century were a period when Britain’s supremacy in the 
world market for manufactured goods was eroded to a not inconsiderable extent. It has been 
estimated that, from 1880-1899, Britain’s share of world manufactured exports fell from 
41.4% to 32.5% (Saul, 1965, p. 12). Did the beginnings of Britain’s relative industrial decline 
in the late nineteenth century correspond to major changes in Britain’s manufacturing 
comparative advantages? This article compares Britain’s late-Victorian manufacturing 
comparative advantages and early-Victorian manufacturing comparative advantages, which 
Temin (1997, pp. 73-9) essentially inferred from the presence of industries among British 
exports and the absence of those same industries among British imports. This article finds 
that, like in the early-Victorian era, Britain’s late-Victorian manufacturing comparative 
advantages were not restricted to a narrow range of industries. Those industries in which 
early-Victorian Britain did, in fact, realize a comparative disadvantage were, in many 
instances, also those (labour-intensive) industries in which late-Victorian Britain would also 
realize a comparative disadvantage. One of the broader contributions of this article is to 
                                                     
 3 Although, as later observed in this article, Habakkuk (1962, pp. 194-5) himself conceded 
that the distinction had diminished by the late nineteenth century. 
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identify a substantial continuity in Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages into the 
period of foreign industrialization in the late nineteenth century.  
 
2. Previous literature 
According to Temin (1997, p. 76), the manufacturing comparative advantages of early-
Victorian Britain spanned a broad range of industries. Temin did not actually construct 
measurements of comparative advantage, but rather concluded the existence of a comparative 
advantage in an industry if it was present in Britain’s export basket and absent from its import 
basket. In 1850-2, Britain’s export basket included an array of industries that were also absent 
from Britain’s import basket. There were some industries, such as silk manufactures and 
clocks and watches, in which Britain had a comparative disadvantage. Still, according to 
Temin (1997, p. 76), ‘Britain maintained a clear comparative advantage in a wide variety of 
manufacturing industries throughout the first half of the nineteenth century’.4 
 Temin’s identifying Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages at mid-century 
was an approach to assessing whether productivity growth during Britain’s industrialization 
was a phenomenon exclusive to key manufacturing industries, chiefly cotton textiles, as 
Crafts (1989a, p. 425) had argued, or whether productivity growth was pervasive throughout 
the sector and extended to traditional manufacturing industries. According to a Ricardian 
model with a continuum of goods arranged according to comparative advantage, if technical 
change between the late-eighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century, i.e. the Industrial 
Revolution era, was limited to just a few key industries, such as cotton textiles and iron, then 
the range of manufacturing industries in Britain’s export (import) basket should have fallen 
(risen).5 Temin (1997, pp. 74-6) found that Britain’s traditional industries largely persisted 
                                                     
 4 Temin (1997, p. 76) correlated the exports of traditional industries at the endpoints of 
various intervals spanning the early nineteenth century. He found very high correlation coefficients. 
 5 Temin’s exposition of the model followed that of Dornbusch et al. (1977). 
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among Britain’s exports through the mid-nineteenth century, leading him to conclude that 
technical change was indeed widespread during the Industrial Revolution.  
 By the mid-nineteenth century, a great international commodity-market integration, 
which resulted from declining transport costs, was contributing to Britain’s specialization in 
manufacturing (O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999). As the price of manufactured goods rose 
relative to the price of agricultural goods in Britain, there followed a sectoral adjustment out 
of agriculture and into manufacturing (and services). In short, O’Rourke and Williamson 
depicted an Atlantic economy specializing along Hechscher-Ohlin (H-O) lines—the Old 
World in the manufacturing sector, the New World in the agricultural sector. They employed 
the H-O model to explain Britain’s specialization in manufacturing, but can the H-O model 
also explain Britain’s specializations within manufacturing, or among industries?  
 Crafts and Thomas (1986) estimated the factor determinants of Britain’s 
manufacturing comparative advantages in selected years from 1910-35, by which time there 
were regular censuses of production from which factor intensities could be calculated. They 
employed a three-factor H-O model, with the factors being capital, (unskilled) labour, and 
human capital. Throughout the period from 1910-35, the manufacturing industries in which 
Britain realized a comparative advantage were relatively intensive in labour, but not in human 
capital; comparative advantage was unaffected by the capital intensity of the industry. They 
then applied the model to late-Victorian Britain, using the cruder data from the Factory 
Inspectorate Returns of 1870, and found similar results, except that capital was a statistically 
significant and positive determinant of Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages 
during this earlier period (Crafts and Thomas, 1986, p. 637). 
Crafts and Thomas used the term ‘comparative advantage’ loosely. For the period from 
1910-35, they estimated the factor determinants of British gross and net exports. For the late-
Victorian era, they estimated the factor determinants of just British gross exports in the year 
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1880, using factor proportions calculated from 1870 data. The issue here is that the value of 
gross exports alone does not indicate the presence of a comparative advantage. Consider the 
industries of silk manufactures and cement. In 1900, the value of British silk exports was 
more than double the value of cement exports, yet Britain realized a comparative 
disadvantage in the former industry and a comparative advantage in the latter industry. This 
article improves upon the work of Crafts and Thomas through the construction of RCA 
indicators. 
Crafts (1989b) did, in fact, construct RCA indicators for Britain’s manufacturing 
industries, along with the manufacturing industries of ten other mostly industrial countries, 
for the years 1899, 1913, 1929, 1937, and 1950. In doing so, he employed the method 
advanced by Balassa, which is discussed fully in the next section of this article. For the year 
1899, Crafts (1989b, p. 130) observed that Britain’s comparative advantages were greatest in 
the more mature industries of shipbuilding, iron, and textiles, rather than in the industries of 
the Second Industrial Revolution, which exhibited greater scope for new technology by the 
closing decades of the nineteenth century. Crafts did not offer any factor-based explanation 
for the pattern of Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages, however.  
One weakness of Crafts’ RCA indicators, especially the RCA indicators for Britain (and 
even more especially for 1899), is the manner in which Crafts divided world manufactured 
exports among industries. For the 1899 RCA indicators, nearly half of Britain’s manufactured 
exports are concentrated in the single industry of textiles, while the other half of Britain’s 
manufactured exports are dispersed among 15 industries. In contrast, the RCA indicators in 
this article are constructed for industries that are defined more consistently with a nineteenth-
century distribution of manufactured exports. The discrepancies between the industry 
definitions used by Crafts and those used in this article are addressed more fully in the next 
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section. Here, it should simply be observed that the data-construction component of this 
article does not seek merely to replicate Crafts’ 1899 RCA indicators. 
Crafts and Thomas’s portrayal of manufacturing in late-Victorian Britain as intensive in 
labour, but not in human capital, was the opposite of what Harley (1974) argued was true of 
manufacturing in (slightly later) Edwardian Britain. He argued that Britain was relatively 
abundant in skilled labour and that the United States, given its influx of migrants from 
southern and eastern Europe, was relatively abundant in unskilled labour (Harley, 1974, pp. 
394-5).6 Harley’s argument is not entirely comparable to that of Crafts and Thomas. Whereas 
Crafts and Thomas were concerned with the pattern of specialization among industries, 
Harley was concerned with intra-industry differences in technique between British and 
American manufacturing, specifically within the industries of shipbuilding, textiles, 
engineering, and iron and steel. Of course, it is essential not to confuse an Anglo-American 
comparison with an Anglo-World comparison. Indeed, one of the themes of this article is that 
Continental Europe, along with the United States, must serve as the reference when 
explaining late-Victorian manufacturing in international context.  
The relationship between human capital and British manufacturing before the First 
World War was revisited by Broadberry (1997, p. 158), who observed that Britain tended to 
realize its highest levels of comparative labour productivity in those industries that used 
intensively Britain’s relatively abundant supply of human capital. Such industries were not so 
amenable to mass production techniques, and instead relied upon a highly-skilled labour 
force. Insofar as comparative advantage approximates comparative labour productivity, the 
finding of Broadberry can be regarded as contrasting with that of Crafts and Thomas on the 
                                                     
6 As Harley noted, the distinction between skilled and unskilled labour offered a potential 
resolution to the famous Leontief paradox in post-war American trade. He speculated that there might 
have been a Leontief paradox in Edwardian British trade, whereby labour-scarce Britain exported 
labour-intensive manufactured commodities. While he did not quite make such an assertion, he did 
claim that the two-factor (capital and labour) H-O model was inadequate (Harley, 1974, pp. 411-13). 
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association between human capital and the best performing industries within late-Victorian 
manufacturing. 
 
3. Constructing the RCA indicators 
Balassa (1965) was interested in identifying the comparative advantages of industrial 
countries, not during the late nineteenth century, but rather during the period of trade 
liberalization that followed the Second World War. For Balassa to have determined 
comparative advantages directly would have required an enormous amount of systematically-
collected data on production costs for every industry-country pair. Instead, Balassa 
endeavoured to determine comparative advantages indirectly, based upon the pattern of world 
trade. Assuming that countries actually traded according to their comparative advantages, 
Balassa (1965, p. 103) then argued that the pattern of world trade ‘revealed’ the comparative 
advantages of countries.  
Balassa’s method for calculating an indicator of RCA is expressed as follows: 





⁄          [1] 
Here, X refers to the current value of exports, i to the manufactured commodity, c to the 
industrial country, and n to the collectivity of industrial countries. The RCA indicator is 
therefore the country-share of world exports of the manufactured commodity, normalized by 
the country-share of world exports of all manufactured commodities. An indicator greater 
than 1 implies a comparative advantage, an indicator less than 1 a comparative disadvantage. 
Theoretically, specialization according to comparative advantage would cause a country’s 
RCA indicators to cluster around Xn/Xc (complete comparative advantage) and 0 (complete 
comparative disadvantage). However, empirically, indicators fall anywhere between these 
two values, oftentimes quite close to the threshold value of 1. One reason is that the 
manufactured commodity, as defined, encompasses enough heterogeneity such that a country 
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may realize a comparative advantage in one variety of the commodity, but a comparative 
disadvantage in another variety of the commodity. This situation is especially likely when the 
RCA indicators are calculated at higher levels of aggregation, such as the industry level, as 
was done by Crafts (1989b), and as is done in this article. Another reason is that the effects of 
trade costs, such as transport costs and tariffs, are internalized in the RCA indicators.7 
For every year from 1870-1913, Jacks et al. (2010) calculated an all-inclusive measure 
of trade costs for each of a 16-country sample of Britain’s (bidirectional) bilateral trade 
flows.8 Additionally, they estimated the intertemporal determinants of Britain’s bilateral trade 
costs using a panel regression with country-pair, i.e. bilateral, fixed effects. They found 
exchange-rate volatility and maritime freight rates to have been positive intertemporal 
determinants of Britain’s bilateral trade costs, and gold standard adherence to have been a 
negative intertemporal determinant (Jacks et al., 2010, p. 135).9 In addition to intertemporal 
variation, Britain’s bilateral trade costs exhibited cross-sectional variation. 10  In 1890, 
Britain’s bilateral trade costs were lowest for Australia and New Zealand, despite their 
distance from Britain, and highest for Indonesia and Japan. To the extent that differing 
                                                     
7 On the relationship between tariffs and RCA, Balassa (1965, p. 104) observed that ‘…as 
long as all exporters are subject to the same tariff, data on relative export performance are not 
distorted by differences in the degree of tariff protection’. However, whereas ad valorem tariffs 
predominated at the time of Balassa’s writing, specific tariffs predominated in the late nineteenth 
century. Differences (across exporting countries) in the price of a commodity would result in differing 
ad valorem equivalent tariffs and, consequently, differing trade costs. Thus, even if all exporters are 
subjected to the same (specific) tariff, the tariff can still distort the data on relative export 
performance. 
 8 Their measure of trade costs is the difference between actual bilateral trade and frictionless 
bilateral trade. The measure is comparable across country pairs. 
 9 However, in the very large Anglo-American trade, Varian (2018) found tariffs to have been 
the sole intertemporal determinant of trade costs.  
 10  Jacks et al. (2010, p. 135) did not estimate the intertemporal and cross-sectional 
determinants of exclusively Britain’s bilateral trade costs, but they did estimate the intertemporal and 
cross-sectional determinants of bilateral trade costs for a larger sample of bilateral pairs that included 
both British and non-British bilateral pairs, e.g. Franco-German. In this random effects regression that 
exploited both the intertemporal and cross-sectional variation in the data, they found that distance and 
tariffs were positive determinants of bilateral trade costs, whilst gold standard adherence, membership 
in the British Empire, and railway density were negative determinants. 
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bilateral trade costs distorted the industry composition of Britain’s exports, the RCA 
indicators would inaccurately measure Britain’s comparative advantages.11 
One way to gauge whether trade costs fundamentally distorted the industry composition 
of Britain’s exports is to compare Britain’s industry-level bilateral exports. In Britain’s trade 
statistics, the disaggregation of exports by both commodity (or industry) and, within that, by 
destination country is highly incomplete.12 Thus, the scope for comparing Britain’s industry-
level bilateral exports is limited. Nevertheless, even a limited comparison can offer some 
indication of the degree to which trade costs altered the industry composition of Britain’s 
exports. In several respects, machinery and silk are ideal industries for comparing Britain’s 
bilateral exports. Crucially, the bilateral disaggregation of the constituent commodities of 
these industries is relatively extensive, permitting an industry-level comparison of machine 
and silk exports to an adequate number of countries.13 In 1890, the value of world exports of 
these mid-sized industries was broadly similar at approximately £33.1 million for machinery, 
including steam engines and locomotives, and £25.3 million for silk manufactures.14 Yet, 
Britain exported almost eight times as much machinery (£16.4 million) as it did silk 
manufactures (£2.2 million). As identified later in this section, Britain had a comparative 
advantage in machinery and a comparative disadvantage in silk manufactures. If trade costs 
did not fundamentally distort the industry composition of Britain’s exports, then it would be 
                                                     
 11 For example, in the presence of transport costs, a commodity might be imported from a 
geographically proximate country, rather than from a country with a comparative advantage in the 
commodity. 
 12 In the commodity disaggregation section of the British trade statistics, the further bilateral 
disaggregation is incomplete due to the category of ‘other foreign countries’; the composition of 
‘other foreign countries’ varies according to the commodity. Similarly, in the bilateral disaggregation 
of the British trade statistics, the further commodity disaggregation is incomplete due to the category 
of ‘all other articles’; the composition of ‘all other articles’ varies according to the country. 
 13 As discussed later in this section, industries are constructed from various commodities. 
Therefore, in order to compare the exports of machinery and silk manufactures to a particular country, 
that country must be specifically reported in the bilateral disaggregation of all of the commodities 
constituting both the machine and silk industries, as those industries are defined in this study.  
 14 The method of estimating the value of world exports in these industries is covered later in 
this section.  
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expected that the ratio of bilateral machine exports to bilateral silk exports would be 
consistently high across Britain’s trade partners. Of the 28 destination countries for which 
there are data on Britain’s bilateral exports of both machinery and silk manufactures in 1890, 
the median ratio of machine exports to silk exports was 8.8. The interquartile range was from 
5.1 to 23.7. All but three of the destination countries had a ratio above 3.0. Certainly, trade 
costs exerted some distorting effect upon the industry composition of Britain’s exports, but 
not to a degree sufficient to render the RCA indicators a widely inaccurate measure of 
comparative advantage. 
In recent literature, a couple of alternative measures to Balassa’s RCA that correct for 
country-pair-specific and commodity-specific trade costs have been proposed. However, 
there is empirical evidence that Balassa’s RCA is broadly consistent with these other 
measures. For the 54 HS-6 commodities in the motor vehicles manufacturing industry (HS-
2), French (2017) estimated three measures: French’s (2017) ‘gravity-based RCA’, Costinot 
et al.’s (2012) ‘revealed productivity’, and Balassa’s (1965) RCA. The measures were 
estimated for the United States relative to Germany. The Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient was 0.94 between Balassa’s RCA and gravity-based RCA, and 0.84 between 
Balassa’s RCA and revealed productivity (French, 2017, p. 94). In view of the alignment 
between Balassa’s RCA and the other measures, as well as the data limitations associated 
with the nineteenth-century trade statistics, this article settles on Balassa’s method for 
identifying comparative advantages.  
RCA indicators are calculated for 18 British manufacturing industries for the years 
1880, 1890, and 1900. The industries—Balassa’s method involved individual manufactured 
commodities—are beer; cement; chemicals; clocks and watches; copper manufactures; cotton 
manufactures; earthenware and chinaware; flax, hemp, and jute manufactures; glass; iron, 
steel, and manufactures thereof; leather and manufactures thereof; machinery; musical 
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instruments; paper and manufactures thereof; rubber manufactures; silk manufactures; spirits; 
and woollen and worsted manufactures. These 18 industries differ noticeably from the 16 
industries for which Crafts calculated RCA indicators. Crafts’ industries were largely 
predetermined in the sense that he relied solely on the highly aggregated manufactured export 
data in Tyszynski’s (1951) statistical compilation, rather than the more disaggregated 
manufactured export data available in the underlying government trade statistics. Crafts’ 
industries are suited to the period he considered, which was the early twentieth century. 
However, several of these industries, such as the electrical industry and the cars and aircraft 
industry, are obviously unsuited to the late nineteenth century. The textile industry presents a 
more serious issue. In 1899, textiles comprised 34% of world manufactured exports and 46% 
of British manufactured exports (calculated from Tyszynski, 1951, p. 277). Earlier in the 
nineteenth century, the share of textiles in British manufactured exports was even higher, at 
61% in 1882-4 (Schlote, 1952, p. 74). Concentrating half of British manufactured exports and 
a third of world manufactured exports into a single industry obscures the actual comparative 
advantages held by countries, which differed based upon the particular class of textile. 
Therefore, for the purpose of calculating RCA indicators for the late nineteenth century, this 
article divides textiles into four classes: cotton manufactures; flax, hemp, and jute 
manufactures; silk manufactures; and woollen and worsted manufactures. In general, the 18 
industries included in this study mirror the industry classifications in the Annual Statements 
of the Trade of the United Kingdom, which is the source for data on the values of British 
manufactured exports. 
It might be argued that these 18 industries do not sufficiently account for the newer 
manufactured commodities and, indeed, industries of the Second Industrial Revolution. Of 
course, such an argument would be more applicable to the year 1900 than the year 1880. Yet, 
it should be observed that many of the industries associated with the Second Industrial 
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Revolution were still quite nascent by the close of the nineteenth century. In 1899, electrical 
goods and automobiles (combined) amounted to slightly more than 1% of the manufactured 
exports of Britain and slightly more than 1% of the manufactured exports of Germany, a 
putative leader in the Second Industrial Revolution (calculated from Tyszynski, 1951, p. 
277). Although, by 1913, these shares had increased to 4% for Britain and 7% for Germany 
(calculated from Tyszynski, 1951, p. 278). On the whole, the 18 industries offer generally 
adequate coverage of world manufactured exports in 1900, even despite the emergence of 
some industries that did not exist in earlier decades.  
Having obtained data on British manufactured exports per industry from the Trade of 
the United Kingdom, the next step in calculating the RCA indicators is to gather data on 
world manufactured exports per industry. This latter value is initially approximated by the 
manufactured exports, per industry, of Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, and the United 
States combined, as recorded in their respective government trade statistics.15 Due to the 
varying classifications of industries in the trade statistics of the different countries, this step 
in constructing the RCA indicators is an immensely challenging one. Crafts and Thomas 
(1986) matched industries between the British and American trade statistics, in order to 
compare the factor determinants of these countries’ exports. They referred to this matching 
process as a ‘problematic and protracted exercise’ (Crafts and Thomas, 1986, p. 632). When 
the trade statistics of five countries are involved, the process is considerably more 
problematic and protracted. For example, the British trade statistics separate saddlery and 
harnesses from leather and manufactures thereof, whereas the trade statistics of other 
countries do not. Such inconsistencies are, however, generally reconcilable, since the finest 
                                                     
15  The sources are Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom with Foreign 
Countries and British Possessions (Britain); Ministère des Finances, Tableau Général du Commerce 
avec les Pays Étrangers (Belgium); Administration des Douanes, Tableau Général du Commerce de 
la France avec ses Colonies et les Puissances Étrangères (France); Kaiserlichen Statistischen Amt, 
Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich (Germany); Treasury Department, Foreign Commerce 
and Navigation of the United States (United States). The American data are for the years 1879/80, 
1889/90, and 1899/1900, its statistical year having spanned from 1 July to 30 June.   
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levels of disaggregation in the trade statistics usually permit the reconstructing of industries. 
Where inconsistencies are ultimately irreconcilable, they are minor and do not materially 
alter the resulting RCA indicators. In order to add together the values of the manufactured 
exports, per industry, of the five industrial countries, all values are converted to sterling using 
the exchange rates reported in Mitchell (1988, p. 702). 
The manufactured exports of Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, and the United States 
accounted for most, though not all, manufactured exports in the late nineteenth century. In 
1899, the manufactured exports of these five countries accounted for 87% of the 
manufactured exports of the 11 industrial countries included in Tyszynski’s statistical 
compilation.16 A coverage rate of 87% implies a reweighting of the value of manufactured 
exports, per industry, of the five industrial countries (Xn,i) by a factor of 1.15.
17 Balassa’s 
original method, represented in equation 1, is therefore modified to include the reweighting: 





⁄        [2] 
This modification to Balassa’s method does not alter the rank order of the indicators. 
However, in marginal cases, the reweighting renders an otherwise comparative-advantage 
industry as a comparative-disadvantage industry, as it does for the British glass industry in 
1880, for example.   
The next step is to normalize the British share of world manufactured exports per 
industry (XUK,i/1.15Xn,i) by, according to Balassa’s method, the British share of world 
manufactured exports across all industries (XUK/Xn). Normalizing by the country-share of 
only secondary-sector world exports was criticized by Vollrath (1991, p. 269), who argued 
for the inclusion of the primary sector in determining comparative advantage. Because the 
British share of secondary-sector world exports exceeded the British share of total world 
                                                     
16 The 11 countries include the five abovementioned industrial countries, as well as Italy, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, India, and Japan. 
17 The implicit assumption is that the share of the omitted industrial countries was equal 
across industries and constant from 1880-1900. 
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exports, the exclusion of the primary sector from the normalization factor reduces the levels 
of the RCA indicators for Britain’s manufacturing industries. 18  Balassa’s procedure for 
normalization, which was employed by Crafts, risks misidentifying a comparative-advantage 
industry as a comparative-disadvantage industry. Because the objective of this study is not to 
identify Britain’s intra-sector industrial comparative advantages, but rather Britain’s 
industrial comparative advantages in a multi-sector economy, the normalization factor 
includes both the primary and secondary sectors. As with the reweighting of per-industry 
manufactured exports, the choice of normalization factor only alters the levels of the 
indicators, not their rank order. Data on the value of total British exports for the years 1880, 
1890, and 1900 come from the Trade of the United Kingdom. Data on the current value of 
total world exports in these years are taken from the recent estimates of Federico and Tena-
Junguito (2016). 
Table 1 presents the resulting RCA indicators for Britain’s manufacturing industries, 
ordered by their rank in 1880. Given the data assembled, calculating RCA indicators for the 
manufacturing industries of the other four industrial countries is simple. Since these 
indicators are likely to be of interest to future researchers, corresponding tables for Belgium, 
France, Germany, and the United States are supplied in Appendix A. 
As evident from the RCA indicators in Table 1, Britain’s late-Victorian manufacturing 
comparative advantages were not restricted to a narrow range of industries, similar to 
Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages in 1850-2, as found by Temin (1997, p. 76). 
Silk manufactures and clocks and watches, which Temin specifically identified as 
comparative-disadvantage industries at mid-century, were also among Britain’s comparative-
disadvantage industries in the late-Victorian era. Another continuity between the early and 
                                                     
18  In contrast, the American share of secondary-sector world exports was less than the 
American share of total world exports in 1899/1900. Thus, excluding the primary sector from the 
normalization factor increases the levels of the RCA indicators for American manufacturing 
industries. In 1899/1900, the primary sector contributed 68% of American exports (United States, 
Treasury Department, 1901). 
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late nineteenth centuries was Britain’s comparative advantage in cotton textiles, which held 
pride of place in all three decadal years. During the late nineteenth century, Britain actually 
advanced its comparative advantage in woollen and worsted manufactures considerably, even 
in spite of the heavy protection that this industry received in other industrial countries.19  
Economic historians have debated the international position of the British engineering 
(machine) industry in the late 1890s, when the American engineering industry greatly 
increased its exports, especially its exports to Britain.20 Nicholas (1980) argued that the rise 
in American machine exports to Britain resulted from a strong upswing in the British 
business cycle, which caused domestic demand to exceed short-run domestic supply. Irwin 
(2003, p. 369), however, attributed the occurrence to the increasing international 
competitiveness of American machinery, driven by a shift in the Anglo-American relative 
price of iron and steel—material inputs of the machine industry. 21  Although the RCA 
indicator for the British machine industry declines somewhat between 1890 and 1900, Britain 
still maintained a clear comparative advantage in this industry. Nonetheless, it should be 
recognized that the heightened level of American machine exports to Britain abated after 
1899. If the indicator was calculated for a year between 1896 and 1899, it could be 
substantially lower. 
In order to gauge the relative persistence of Britain’s comparative advantages, 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients are calculated for various intervals, following the 
approach undertaken by Crafts. Table 2 presents coefficients for the intervals covered in this 
                                                     
19 For a discussion of the protection that British woollen and worsted exports encountered in 
foreign markets, see Saul (1960, p. 151). If such protection enabled foreign manufactures to become 
internationally competitive, per the infant industry argument, then Britain’s comparative advantage in 
this industry would have been affected.   
20  Although, Clapham (1938, p. 36) noted, ‘Long before the ’nineties, exports of new 
American machinery, or of American mechanical notions, had affected the course and pace of 
industrial change in Britain’. 
21 The decline in the American price of iron and steel (relative to the British price) can be 
attributed to the fall in the American price of iron ore resulting from the opening of the Mesabi Range 
in the 1890s. 
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article, as well as for the intervals covered by Crafts. Different industry classifications 
prohibit the calculation of coefficients for intervals that span the turn of the twentieth century. 
Persistence during the late-Victorian era was roughly on par with persistence during the early 
twentieth century. The correlation coefficient is slightly lower for 1880-1900 than for 1899-
1913, but this should be expected given the greater length of the former interval. What can be 
claimed with some certainty is that Britain’s comparative advantages underwent a more 
substantial reordering during the 1890s than during the 1880s, when the comparative 
advantages were remarkably persistent. By the 1890s, the protectionist backlash in 
Continental Europe had been underway for a decade, and the reordering of Britain’s 
comparative advantages in the 1890s may have been influenced by some Continental 
industries having emerged as internationally competitive. 
 
4. Factor determinants of Britain’s comparative advantages 
In this section, the factor determinants of Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages are 
estimated using a four-factor H-O model, with the factors being capital, labour, material 
inputs, and human capital. For all factors apart from human capital, intensities (or proxies 
therefor) for the 18 British manufacturing industries are calculated from the data included in 
the Final Report of the First Census of Production, which covers manufacturing activity in 
Britain in the year 1907. Conveniently, the data is disaggregated at the industry and sub-
industry levels, thereby permitting the reconstructing of industries so that they are consistent 
with the industries defined in the previous section of this article. The process is rather 
straightforward, and the exact components of the reconstructed industries are detailed in 
Appendix B. One important assumption is that the sub-industry of (textile) bleaching, dyeing, 
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printing, and finishing trades is allocated among the four classes of textiles proportionally, 
according to gross output.22        
Factor intensities per industry are reported in Table 3. Capital intensity is proxied by 
horsepower per £1 million of gross output.23 Labour intensity is proxied by workers per £1 
million of gross output. Both of these proxies resemble the ones employed by Crafts and 
Thomas (1986) for estimating the factor determinants of British exports in 1880, although 
their source of data was the more rudimentary Factory Inspectorate Returns of 1870, as 
compiled by Musson (1976, pp. 437-9). Because the First Census of Production reports the 
value of material inputs, material intensity is measured directly as the share of material inputs 
in gross output. This factor was not among the three factors in Crafts and Thomas’s model. 
The omission of material intensity is not trivial, since the share of material inputs in gross 
output typically exceeded one-half and varied widely across industries, ranging from 36% for 
clocks and watches to 83% for copper manufactures. 
Imposing Edwardian factor proportions on late-Victorian manufacturing industries is, 
recognizably, less than ideal. 24  This approach is mostly necessitated by the lack of 
systematically collected data across a range of industries for the late-Victorian era. Britain 
was a latecomer among industrial countries in collecting data on manufacturing output, and 
                                                     
22 In 1907, the gross output of this sub-industry was £17.9 million, or about 6% of the entire 
textile industry. This sub-industry is allocated as follows: 60.7% to cotton manufactures, including 
yarn; 26.4% to woollen and worsted manufactures, including yarn; 11.2% to flax, hemp, and jute 
manufactures, including yarn and cordage; and 1.8% to silk manufactures. 
23 A proxy for capital intensity per industry is necessary, as the First Census of Production of 
1907 did not collect data on the manufacturing capital stock. The census did, however, collect data on 
horsepower per industry and sub-industry. Somewhat rudimentary evidence of the suitability of 
horsepower as a proxy for capital can be obtained from the American Twelfth Census of 1900, which 
collected data on both capital and horsepower per industry. At the 15-industry level of disaggregation 
of American manufacturing, the correlation coefficient between the capital stock (standardized by 
gross output)—not the capital cost—and horsepower (standardized by gross output) is 0.52. This 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. Excluding the industry of lumber and its 
remanufactures, which existed to a far lesser extent in Britain than in the United States, causes the 
correlation coefficient to rise to 0.57. As should be expected, the 15 industries defined in the Twelfth 
Census do not match the 18 industries defined in this article. 
24 Beach and Hanlon (2018) offers a recent precedent for backdating factor intensities from 
the 1907 census into the nineteenth century. They applied the cross-industry variation in coal use per 
worker from the 1907 census to the year 1851.  
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the 1907 census was the first such exercise.25 The error of backdating the factor proportions is 
perhaps not so grave in the context of mature industrial Britain, with its generally slow 
growth in output and inputs. While acknowledging some change in the factor proportions of 
individual industries between the late nineteenth century and 1907, the foregoing analysis 
nonetheless relies on the cross-industry variation in factor intensities calculated from the First 
Census of Production, which represents the best available source for the given purpose. 
The proxy for human capital intensity per industry is calculated as the difference 
between the average industry wage and the wage of unskilled or ‘raw’ manufacturing labour. 
Variations of this approach have been used in other studies of the nineteenth-century 
economy (e.g. Williamson, 1985; Rosés, 1998). In calculating the human capital intensity 
proxy, the data used are the average industry wages of adult males working full time.26 The 
unskilled manufacturing wage is taken to be the average wage (£1.01 per week) of an adult 
male ‘general labourer’ working full time in the cotton textile industry. The data for the 
human capital intensity proxy are obtained from the reports of the Earnings and Hours 
Enquiry of 1906, and are therefore contemporaneous with the data for the other factor-
intensity proxies.27 Once again, industries are reconstructed from the sub-industries in the 
Earnings and Hours Enquiry so that the resulting industries correspond to the RCA 
indicators. The components of the reconstructed industries are detailed in Appendix B, along 
with the employment-share weights applied to the sub-industry average wages. 
The H-O model takes the form of a semi-log OLS regression. The dependent variable is 
a symmetric version of the RCA indicator. Following the procedure advanced by Laursen 
                                                     
25 By comparison, the United States was collecting such data a century before Britain. 
26  Using the average industry wages of all labourers, including females, would likely 
understate the human capital intensity of those industries that relied disproportionately on female 
labour. For example, an adult male warper working full time in the woollen industry was paid a time-
wage of £1.20 per week, while an adult female warper working full time in the woollen industry was 
paid a time-wage of £0.70 per week. 
27 The sources are Earnings and Hours Enquiry: I; Earnings and Hours Enquiry: II; Earnings 
and Hours Enquiry: VI; Earnings and Hours Enquiry: VIII. 
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(2015), an indicator of revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA) is calculated as 
(RCA-1)/(RCA+1).28 The baseline specification of the regression equation can be expressed 
as follows, with i referring to the industry and t referring to the year (1880, 1890, or 1900): 
RSCA𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶 + 𝛼 ln(𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑖) + 𝛽 ln(𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖) + 𝛾 ln(𝑀𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐴𝐿𝑖) +
𝛿𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑈𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑖) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡       [3] 
Each of the regressions (apart from those in columns 5-7 of Table 4) combines the RSCA 
observations from all three decadal years. The regressions are estimated using decade (time) 
fixed effects, which control for any decade-to-decade overall changes in Britain’s RSCA 
indicators, such as may have resulted from foreign industrialization and increasing foreign 
manufactured exports in the late nineteenth century. Moreover, in a particular decadal year, 
the RSCA indicators may have been generally lower or higher due to the cyclicality of British 
exports.29  
 The results of the regressions are presented in Table 4, with robustness checks 
presented in Appendix C. From column 1, which presents the results from the baseline 
specification of the regression, it is evident that Britain’s comparative advantages were in the 
relatively capital-intensive manufacturing industries and, inconsistent with Crafts and 
Thomas, in the relatively labour-economizing manufacturing industries. This finding is 
discussed shortly. 
The statistical insignificance of the coefficient of material intensity does not permit the 
claim that the manufacturing comparative advantages were material-economizing. Given 
Britain’s limited natural resource endowments, this result may seem surprising. However, one 
                                                     
28 The RCA indicator is asymmetric, as the range for comparative disadvantage lies between 0 
and 1, while the range for comparative advantage lies between 1 and the reciprocal of the country’s 
share of world exports, which would be 6.2 for Britain in 1890. Laursen (2015, pp. 105-7) called for 
making the RCA indicator symmetric for the purpose of regression analysis, since the use of an 
asymmetric indicator would more likely result in a violation of the normality assumption for the error 
terms. 




potential explanation lies in what lay beneath Britain: coal. Insofar as coal was a material 
input in the manufacturing sector, Britain’s natural resource endowments were exceptionally 
favourable. It would stand to reason that the RCA indicators would be higher, ceteris paribus, 
for particularly coal-intensive industries, including cement and earthenware. 30  Is the 
statistical insignificance of the coefficient of material intensity attributable to Britain’s 
abundant supply of coal? Because the First Census of Production recorded the quantities of 
coal and coke use per industry, it is possible to adjust the material-intensity variable to 
exclude coal and coke. 31  Column 2 presents the results of the regression with non-coal 
material intensity. Still, the statistical insignificance of the coefficient of material intensity 
remains unchanged.32  
A more compelling explanation comes from trade policy. Victorian Britain was unique 
in espousing a policy of free trade, which extended to raw materials and intermediate inputs. 
Unlike in other industrial countries, where a protectionist backlash had taken hold, the British 
manufacturing sector could obtain material inputs at the world price. The relatively material-
intensive industry of woollen and worsted manufactures illustrates this point well. By the late 
nineteenth century, the majority of the raw wool used in the British woollen and worsted 
industry was imported, and this imported share reached as high as four-fifths by 1895-9 
                                                     
30 In 1907, the factor proportion of coal (and coke) in the cement and earthenware industries 
was 22% and 7%, respectively. In each of the other 16 manufacturing industries, the factor proportion 
was less than 5%. 
31 The material intensity variable is adjusted to exclude coal and coke usage per industry, the 
domestic prices of steam coal (£0.458 per ton) and coke (£0.839 per ton) calculated from the First 
Census of Production. 
32 Attention should be directed to columns 3 and 4 of Appendix C, which presents several 
robustness checks. When the RSCA indicators are regressed against only material intensity (column 
3), the coefficient of material intensity is positive and statistically significant. When the RSCA 
indicators are regressed against only non-coal material intensity, then the coefficient is positive, but 
statistically insignificant. This discrepancy suggests that Britain’s manufacturing comparative 
advantages were coal-intensive. In the main specification of the model (Table 4, column 1), however, 
the coefficient of material intensity is insignificant, likely because coal usage is captured by the proxy 
variable for capital intensity, which is horsepower per £1 million gross output. Nevertheless, there is 
no basis for claiming that the manufacturing comparative advantages of late-Victorian Britain 
economized upon non-coal material inputs. 
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(Deane and Cole, 1964, p. 196). The American woollen and worsted industry also relied 
heavily on imported wool. However, whereas Britain imported wool free of duty, the United 
States imposed a high duty on this imported material input. Following the passage of the 
McKinley Tariff of 1890, the ad valorem equivalent tariff on wool exceeded 40% (United 
States, Treasury Department, 1892). The divergent trade policies of Britain and the United 
States may account, at least in part, for why the RCA indicator for the British woollen and 
worsted industry steadily increased throughout the late nineteenth century, whilst the 
American woollen and worsted industry remained at a nearly perfect comparative 
disadvantage. 
In addition to wool, Britain imported a range of material inputs for its manufacturing 
sector, and many of these material inputs were sourced from the British Empire. The recent 
gravity literature yields unambiguous evidence for an empire effect on commodity trade. 
Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008) estimated that membership in the British Empire alone 
more than doubled intra-Empire bilateral trade flows. Following a different empirical 
strategy, Jacks et al. (2010, p. 135) estimated that membership in the British Empire reduced 
intra-Empire bilateral trade costs by half. To be sure, access to a resource-rich empire 
mitigated the effects of Britain’s relatively unfavourable (non-coal) natural resource 
endowments on its manufacturing sector and may partly account for the statistical 
insignificance of the coefficient of material intensity. 
The coefficient of human capital intensity is statistically insignificant. It is therefore not 
possible to draw any conclusion on whether Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages 
utilised or economised on human capital in the final decades of the nineteenth century. 
As already discussed, the estimation of equation 3 uses late-Victorian data for the 
dependent variable and Edwardian data for the explanatory variables. Given this temporal 
mismatch, it is worth checking whether use of earlier data from the Factory Inspectorate 
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Returns of 1870 bears out a similar result. Industries are reconstructed from the sub-industries 
in Musson’s (1976, pp. 437-9) compilation of the Factory Inspectorate Returns, so that the 
resulting industries correspond to the RCA indicators. The components of the reconstructed 
industries are listed in Appendix B. The Factory Inspectorate Returns report the quantities of 
steam horsepower and labourers in each industry and sub-industry, but not the value of 
output. Thus, it is necessary to standardize capital and labour relative to each other. Column 4 
regresses the RSCA indicators against the log of the proxy for the 1870 capital-labour ratio. 
The coefficient is positive and statistically significant, as expected. This result is reminiscent 
of Wright’s (1990, p. 659) finding that the capital-labour ratio was a positive and statistically 
significant determinant of the net exports of American manufacturing industries in 1879.  
It should be observed that the 1870 and 1907 (proxied) capital-labour ratios are highly 
correlated. 33  The correlation coefficient is 0.94 and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level.34 This high correlation suggests that the discrepancy between the finding of this article 
and that of Crafts and Thomas on the factor determinants of Britain’s manufacturing 
comparative advantages does not derive from the vintage of the sources used for calculating 
factor intensities, but rather likely from the use of actual measures of comparative advantage, 
i.e. (symmetric) RCA indicators, instead of gross exports. 
Did the factor determinants of Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages change 
throughout the 1880s and 1890s? Does pooling the data for all three decadal years obscure an 
instability in the statistical significance (or possibly signs) of the factor coefficients? These 
questions are answered by estimating separate regressions for each of the three decadal years. 
In view of the small number of observations, only the variables for capital intensity and 
labour intensity are included in the regression. Column 4 presents the results of the two-factor 
                                                     
 33 For clarity, it should be stressed that the 1907 capital-labour ratio is not an explanatory 
variable in any of the specifications in Table 4. 
 34 This correlation coefficient is calculated from the 17 industries, which exclude cement, as 
it was not reported in the Factory Inspectorate Returns of 1870. 
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H-O model, combining the data from all three years. Columns 5-7 present the results of the 
decadal regressions.  
In the 1880 regression (column 5), the coefficient of labour intensity, though negative, 
is statistically insignificant at any conventional level. This finding might well be interpreted 
as a vestige of the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 and the increased imports of grain that 
followed. The grain imports displaced agricultural labourers, who formed a cheap supply of 
labour that the British manufacturing sector could draw upon. To be sure, this process was 
not an immediate one, with O’Rourke and Williamson (1999, p. 87) observing that the British 
agricultural sector did not begin its absolute decline until the 1870s, with the start of the so-
called Grain Invasion. However, by the late-Victorian era, as Habakkuk (1962, p. 195) noted, 
‘The rise of real wages of English agricultural labour in the 1880s and ’90’s certainly 
suggests that the surplus of agricultural labour had been absorbed in English industry or by 
emigration’.  
Emigration contributed to the increasing relative scarcity of labour in late-Victorian 
Britain, most acutely during the 1880s. Net emigration from Britain, almost entirely to the 
higher-wage Dominions and the United States, averaged 3.2/1,000 population per annum 
from 1880-9, compared to 2.9 for Germany, 0.2 for France, and -1.1 for Belgium (Hatton and 
Williamson, 1998, p. 33). In the counterfactual scenario of zero net emigration from 1870-
1910, Hatton and Williamson (1998, p. 224) estimated that real wages in 1910 would have 
been 9% lower in Britain, 3% lower in Germany, unchanged in France, 9% higher in 
Belgium, and 15% higher in the United States. The comparatively high (among industrial 
countries) net emigration from Britain was not without consequence for Britain’s 
manufacturing comparative advantages.  
By the closing decade of the late-Victorian era, there was a distinctly labour-
economizing regime within British manufacturing. This labour-economizing regime should 
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be appreciated in a global context that includes the United States and, even more importantly, 
Continental Europe. Continental Europe supplied more than half of world manufactured 
exports in 1899. There, labour was comparatively more abundant than in Britain. Ignoring 
Continental Europe and embracing the textbook archetype of labour-economizing American 
manufacturing (and labour-utilizing British manufacturing) would obscure what was a 
fundamentally labour-economizing regime in British manufacturing.35 Altogether, it might be 
suggested that, in the late-Victorian era, the starker contrast was not between the factor 
determinants of the manufacturing comparative advantages in Britain and in the United 
States, but rather between the factor determinants of the manufacturing comparative 
advantages in the Anglosphere and on the Continent. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In his classic study of the Anglo-German commercial rivalry, Hoffman (1964, p. 127) 
identified Norway was an export market in which Britain and Germany closely competed in 
the 1880s. While the values of British and German bilateral exports to Norway were roughly 
equal, there were some stark differences in the compositions of bilateral exports. In 1890, 
Norway imported three times the value of cotton textiles from Britain as from Germany 
(Norway, Det Statistike Centralbureau, 1891). Yet, Norway’s imports of silk textiles from 
Germany exceeded its imports of silk textiles from Britain by a factor of ten (Norway, Det 
Statistike Centralbureau, 1891). Indeed, such compositional differences are attributable to the 
relative scarcity of labour in Britain and the labour-economizing pattern of its manufacturing 
comparative advantages. In the relatively labour-intensive silk industry, Britain was at a 
comparative disadvantage. In the cotton industry, with its lower factor proportion of labour, 
                                                     
 35 On this point, it is worth noting that Habakkuk (1962, pp. 194-5) stated, ‘And if American 
labour was, except in the remoter parts of the country, no longer scarce, in England it was no longer 
as abundant as it had been earlier in the century’. 
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Britain possessed a definitive comparative advantage that persisted throughout the late-
Victorian era. More generally, it can be concluded that the H-O model is useful for 
explaining Britain’s intra-sector manufacturing comparative advantages. 
This article has revised the prevailing idea that the manufacturing comparative 
advantages of late-Victorian Britain were in the relatively labour-intensive industries (Crafts 
and Thomas, 1986, p. 637). One implication of this revision is to accentuate the distinction 
between manufacturing in Britain and manufacturing on the Continent. A lengthy literature 
has already parsed the differences between British and American manufacturing in the 
nineteenth century, and these differences need not be diminished. However, future scholars 
might prefer to emphasize some of the similarities between British and American—
Anglosphere—manufacturing, compared to Continental manufacturing. Indeed, the labour-
economizing regime of manufacturing in late-Victorian Britain suggests a greater similarity 
between Britain and the United States than had perhaps been thought. 
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Table 1.   RCA indicators for Britain, 1880-1900 
Industry 1880 1890 1900 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 4.6 (1) 4.4 (1) 4.3 (1) 
Copper manufactures 4.2 (2) 3.9 (2) 1.5 (10) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, 
excluding machinery 
3.5 (3) 3.3 (5) 2.5 (5) 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
3.4 (4) 3.5 (4) 3.3 (2) 
Beer 3.4 (5) 3.6 (3) 3.0 (3) 
Machinery, including steam engines and 
locomotives 
3.2 (6) 3.1 (6) 2.4 (7) 
Cement 2.6 (7) 2.4 (9) 1.2 (12) 
Earthenware and chinaware 2.6 (8) 2.7 (7) 1.9 (9) 
Rubber manufactures 2.5 (9) 2.5 (8) 2.0 (8) 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
2.1 (10) 2.3 (10) 2.7 (4) 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, medicine, 
and paint 
1.6 (11) 1.5 (11) 1.2 (11) 
Paper and manufactures thereof 0.9 (12) 1.0 (13) 0.8 (14) 
Glass 0.9 (13) 1.0 (14) 0.8 (15) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 0.9 (14) 0.9 (15) 0.9 (13) 
Musical instruments 0.6 (15) 0.4 (18) 0.4 (17) 
Clocks and watches 0.6 (16) 0.4 (17) 0.2 (18) 
Silk manufactures 0.5 (17) 0.5 (16) 0.5 (16) 
Spirits 0.5 (18) 1.3 (12) 2.5 (6) 
Sources: See text. 










































Table 2.   Spearman correlation coefficients of Britain’s RCA indicators, 1880-1950 
 1890 1899/1900 1913 1929 1937 
1880 0.93 0.69 -- -- -- 
1890 -- 0.83 -- -- -- 
1899/1900 0.83 -- 0.77 0.41 0.32 
1913 -- 0.77 -- 0.76 0.70 
1929 -- 0.41 0.76 -- 0.89 
1937 -- 0.32 0.70 0.89 -- 
1950 -- 0.18 0.38 0.47 0.75 
Sources: Coefficients for intervals from 1880-1900 are calculated using data constructed in this 




















Beer 961 1,263 0.38 0.30 
Cement 16,085 3,968 0.48 0.41 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, 
medicine, and paint 
3,845 2,028 0.62 0.40 
Clocks and watches 897 8,648 0.36 0.62 
Copper manufactures 2,537 1,241 0.83 0.57 
Cotton manufactures, including 
yarn 
7,303 3,424 0.72 0.44 
Earthenware and chinaware 3,431 8,987 0.38 0.61 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
5,377 4,738 0.68 0.18 
Glass 4,293 6,489 0.38 0.80 
Iron, steel, and manufactures 
thereof, excluding machinery 
8,897 3,263 0.66 0.81 
Leather and manufactures thereof 992 3,994 0.68 0.37 
Machinery, including steam engines 
and locomotives 
3,218 4,485 0.47 0.61 
Musical instruments 1,168 5,416 0.42 0.85 
Paper and manufactures thereof 11,080 3,957 0.64 0.50 
Rubber manufactures 3,080 2,699 0.67 0.33 
Silk manufactures 4,014 6,128 0.62 0.30 
Spirits 1,768 865 0.79 0.14 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
4,656 3,614 0.71 0.34 
Sources: See text. 
Notes: Capital intensity is horsepower per £1 million gross output. Labour intensity is workers per £1 
million gross output. Material intensity is the share of material inputs in gross output. Human capital 



















Table 4.   RSCA indicators for Britain’s manufacturing industries, 1880-1900 






































      
Material 
intensity, exc. 





































YES YES YES YES NO NO NO 
R2 0.33 0.32 0.44 0.32 0.24 0.39 0.38 










1880 1890 1900 
Sources: See text and Appendix B. 
Notes: The dependent variable is the RSCA indicator. All explanatory variables are expressed in 
natural logarithms. Standard errors are noted in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 
10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Col. 3 omits the cement industry, as it did 
not appear in the Factory Inspectorate Returns of 1870. 
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Table A.1.   RCA indicators for Belgium, 1880-1900 
Industry 1880 1890 1900 
Glass 9.3 (1) 7.6 (1) 8.9 (1) 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
4.7 (2) 5.4 (2) 5.4 (3) 
Paper and manufactures thereof 3.0 (3) 1.6 (7) 1.6 (7) 
Machinery, including steam engines and 
locomotives 
2.8 (4) 3.6 (3) 2.5 (4) 
Cement 2.6 (5) 1.3 (9) 5.6 (2) 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
2.0 (6) 1.5 (8) 0.9 (10) 
Earthenware and chinaware 0.9 (7) 2.0 (5) 1.7 (6) 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, medicine, 
and paint 
0.8 (8) 2.0 (4) 2.2 (5) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, 
excluding machinery 
0.7 (9) 1.7 (6) 1.5 (8) 
Spirits 0.6 (10) 0.1 (14) 0.4 (12) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 0.5 (11) 0.7 (10) 1.3 (9) 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 0.4 (12) 0.3 (12) 0.4 (11) 
Copper manufactures 0.2 (13) 0.4 (11) 0.2 (13) 
Rubber manufactures 0.1 (14) 0.1 (16) 0.2 (14) 
Musical instruments 0.1 (15) 0.1 (13) 0.1 (15) 
Beer 0.1 (16) 0.1 (16) 0.0 (17) 
Silk manufactures 0.0 (17) 0.1 (15) 0.1 (16) 
Clocks and watches 0.0 (18) 0.0 (18) 0.0 (18) 
Sources: See text. 












Table A.2.   RCA indicators for France, 1880-1900 
Industry 1880 1890 1900 
Spirits 4.8 (1) 5.3 (1) 3.9 (3) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 4.4 (2) 4.0 (4) 3.2 (4) 
Clocks and watches 3.9 (3) 4.0 (3) 5.1 (2) 
Silk manufactures 3.9 (4) 4.7 (2) 6.0 (1) 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
2.7 (5) 2.6 (5) 2.3 (5) 
Paper and manufactures thereof 2.7 (6) 2.3 (7) 1.9 (8) 
Musical instruments 2.1 (7) 1.2 (11) 1.5 (10) 
Glass 1.7 (8) 2.3 (6) 2.2 (6) 
Earthenware and chinaware 1.4 (9) 1.9 (9) 1.8 (9) 
Rubber manufactures 1.2 (10) 0.8 (12) 1.0 (12) 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, medicine, 
and paint 
1.2 (11) 1.2 (10) 1.4 (11) 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
0.9 (12) 0.6 (16) 1.0 (13) 
Machinery, including steam engines and 
locomotives 
0.5 (13) 0.8 (14) 0.5 (18) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, 
excluding machinery 
0.5 (14) 0.8 (13) 0.6 (16) 
Cement 0.4 (15) 2.0 (8) 1.9 (7) 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 0.3 (16) 0.5 (17) 0.8 (14) 
Copper manufactures 0.3 (17) 0.6 (15) 0.7 (15) 
Beer 0.1 (18) 0.3 (18) 0.6 (17) 
Sources: See text. 












Table A.3.   RCA indicators for Germany, 1880-1900 
Industry 1880 1890 1900 
Musical instruments 4.8 (1) 7.1 (1) 5.0 (1) 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, medicine, 
and paint 
4.3 (2) 4.5 (3) 3.8 (3) 
Silk manufactures 4.0 (3) 3.9 (4) 2.7 (7) 
Paper and manufactures thereof 3.2 (4) 4.7 (2) 3.9 (2) 
Rubber manufactures 3.1 (5) 3.6 (5) 3.1 (5) 
Cement 3.1 (6) 2.8 (7) 2.8 (6) 
Beer 2.9 (7) 2.4 (9) 2.4 (8) 
Earthenware and chinaware 2.8 (8) 2.2 (12) 3.3 (4) 
Clocks and watches 2.3 (9) 2.9 (6) 2.2 (10) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 2.2 (10) 2.8 (8) 2.0 (11) 
Glass 2.0 (11) 2.4 (10) 1.7 (13) 
Spirits 2.0 (12) 1.4 (15) 1.0 (17) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, 
excluding machinery 
2.0 (13) 1.9 (13) 2.0 (12) 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
1.9 (14) 2.3 (11) 2.2 (9) 
Machinery, including steam engines and 
locomotives 
1.3 (15) 1.0 (16) 1.6 (14) 
Copper manufactures 1.3 (16) 1.4 (14) 1.2 (15) 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 0.7 (17) 0.9 (17) 1.0 (16) 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
0.5 (18) 0.6 (18) 0.5 (18) 
Sources: See text. 












Table A.4.   RCA indicators for the United States, 1880-1900 
Industry 1880 1890 1900 
Clocks and watches 1.3 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.4 (5) 
Spirits 0.8 (2) 0.5 (6) 0.6 (10) 
Musical instruments 0.6 (3) 0.6 (5) 1.0 (7) 
Machinery, including steam engines and 
locomotives 
0.6 (4) 0.8 (3) 1.6 (2) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 0.5 (5) 0.8 (2) 1.6 (3) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, 
excluding machinery 
0.2 (6) 0.4 (8) 1.4 (4) 
Rubber manufactures 0.2 (7) 0.7 (4) 1.1 (6) 
Paper and manufactures thereof 0.2 (8) 0.2 (12) 0.7 (9) 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, medicine, 
and paint 
0.2 (9) 0.4 (9) 0.6 (11) 
Glass 0.2 (10) 0.3 (11) 0.4 (14) 
Copper manufactures 0.2 (11) 0.5 (7) 3.7 (1) 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 0.2 (12) 0.2 (14) 0.4 (13) 
Beer 0.2 (13) 0.4 (10) 0.9 (8) 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
0.2 (14) 0.2 (13) 0.4 (12) 
Cement 0.1 (15) 0.1 (15) 0.1 (16) 
Earthenware and chinaware 0.0 (16) 0.1 (16) 0.1 (15) 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
0.0 (17) 0.0 (17) 0.0 (17) 
Silk manufactures 0.0 (18) 0.0 (18) 0.0 (18) 
Sources: See text. 
Note: Rankings of indicators are noted in parentheses. 
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Appendix B. Industry components of factor intensities 
 
Capital, labour, and material inputs (1907) 
The data for calculating the factor intensities (or proxies therefor) of capital, labour, and material 
inputs are obtained from the First Census of Production of 1907. The 18 industries in this article 
correspond to the following industries and sub-industries in the census: 
Beer: Brewing and malting trades 
Cement: Cement trade 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, medicine, and paint: Chemicals, coal tar products, drugs, and 
perfumery trade; Paint, colour, and varnish trades 
Clocks and watches: Watch and clock trades 
Copper manufactures: Copper and brass trades (smelting, rolling, and casting) 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn: Cotton trade; 60.7% of Bleaching, dyeing, printing, and 
finishing trades 
Earthenware and chinaware: China and earthenware trades 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, including yarn and cordage: Jute, hemp, and linen trades; 
11.2% of Bleaching, dyeing, printing, and finishing trades; Rope, twine, and net trades 
Glass: Glass, stone, roofing, felts, and miscellaneous trades 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, excluding machinery: Iron and steel, engineering, and 
shipbuilding trades (all sub-industries thereof), excluding Engineering trades (including 
electrical engineering), excluding Shipbuilding and marine engineering trades, and excluding 
Small arms trades 
Leather and manufactures thereof: Boot and shoe trades; Glove trade; Leather trade (tanning and 
dressing); Saddlery and harness trade; Traveling bag and fancy leather goods trade 
Machinery, including steam engines and locomotives: Engineering trades (including electrical 
engineering) 
Musical instruments: Musical instruments trades 
Paper and manufactures thereof: Paper trade; Cardboard box trade 
Rubber and manufactures thereof: Indiarubber trades 
Silk manufactures: Silk trades; 1.8% of Bleaching, dyeing, printing, and finishing trades 
Spirits: Spirit distilling trade; Spirit compounding, rectifying, and methylating trades 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, including yarn: Woollen and worsted trades; 26.4% of 
Bleaching, dyeing, printing, and finishing trades 
 
Human capital (1906) 
The data for calculating the proxy for human capital intensity are obtained from the reports of the 
Hours and Earnings Enquiry of 1906. The 18 industries in this article correspond to the industries and 
sub-industries listed here. Following each of the 18 industries, the average weekly wage of an adult 
male working full time, without the deduction of the unskilled manufacturing wage (£1.01), is noted 
in parentheses. The average industry wage reported in parentheses is an employment-share-weighted 
average of the average wages in the constituent industries and sub-industries. The weights attached to 
each of the constituent industries and sub-industries are noted in parentheses, as well. 
Beer (£1.31): Malting and brewing (1.000) 
Cement (£1.42): Lime and cement works (1.000)  
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, medicine, and paint (£1.41): Chemical manufacture (0.595); Other 
chemical industries (0.405)  
Clocks and watches (£1.63): Watch and clock making and repairing (1.000) 
Copper manufactures (£1.58): Manufacture of brass and allied metal wares (0.389); Smelting, 
rolling, &c. of metals other than iron (0.611) 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn (£1.45): Cotton (0.731); 60.7% of Bleaching, printing, dying, 
and finishing textile fabrics (0.269)  
Earthenware and chinaware (£1.62): Porcelain, china and earthenware manufacture (1.000)  
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, including yarn and cordage (£1.19): Linen (0.584); 11.2% of 
Bleaching, printing, dying, and finishing textile fabrics (0.081); Jute (0.229); Hemp (0.106) 
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Glass (£1.80): Glass bottle manufacture (0.653); Other glass industries (0.347) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, excluding machinery (£1.81): Pig iron manufacture (blast 
furnaces) (0.128); Iron and steel manufacture (0.463); Tinplate manufacture (0.070); 
Manufacture of light iron castings, stoves, grates, &c. (0.088); Wire drawing and working 
(0.054); Manufacture of edge tools, spades, files, &c. (0.023); Cycle making and repairing 
(0.047); Tube manufacture (0.056); Nails, screws, nuts, &c. manufacture (0.018); Bedstead 
manufacture (0.014); Farriery and General Smiths’ Work (0.014); Needle, fish-hooks, and 
fishing-tackle manufacture (0.005); Chain, anchor, &c. manufacture (0.010); Lock, latch, key, 
&c. manufacture (0.005); Typefounding (0.006)   
Leather and manufactures thereof (£1.38): Leather tanning and dressing, fellmongering, &c. 
(0.331); Saddlery, harness, and whip manufacture (0.041); Portmanteau, bag, purse, and 
miscellaneous leather manufacture (0.040); Boot and shoe (ready made) (0.564); Leather glove 
(0.025) 
Machinery, including steam engines and locomotives (£1.62): Engineering and boilermaking 
(1.000) 
Musical instruments (£1.86): Musical instrument manufacture (1.000) 
Paper and manufactures thereof (£1.51): Paper manufacture (0.505); Paper stationery manufacture 
(0.325); Cardboard, canvas, &c. box manufacture (0.054); Wallpaper, &c. manufacture (0.116)  
Rubber and manufactures thereof : Indiarubber, gutta percha, &c. industry (1.000) 
Silk manufactures (£1.31): Silk (0.747); 1.8% of Bleaching, printing, dying, and finishing textile 
fabrics (0.253) 
Spirits (£1.15): Spirit distilling (1.000)  
Woollen and worsted manufactures, including yarn (£1.35): Woollen and worsted (0.762); 26.4% 
of Bleaching, printing, dying, and finishing textile fabrics (0.238) 
 
Capital-labour ratio (1870) 
The data for calculating the proxy for the capital-labour ratio are obtained from Musson (1976, pp. 
437-9), which compiled the data from the Factory Inspectorate Returns of 1870. It should be 
observed that there are no data for the cement industry. The 17 remaining industries in this article 
correspond to the following industries and sub-industries reported in Musson:  
Beer: Breweries  
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, medicine, and paint: Miscellaneous chemical works 
Clocks and watches: Clocks and watches 
Copper manufactures: Copper-mills 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn: Cotton factories  
Earthenware and chinaware: Potteries; Other earthenware 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, including yarn and cordage: Flax factories; Hemp factories; 
Jute factories; Ropemaking 
Glass: Glass-making 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, excluding machinery: Blast furnaces and iron-mills; 
Foundries; Type- and stereotype-founding; Nails and rivets; Cutlery; Files, saws, and tools; 
Locks 
Leather and manufactures thereof: Leather manufactures (all sub-industries thereof); Boot- and 
shoe-making; Manufacture of gloves 
Machinery, including steam engines and locomotives: Manufacture of machinery  
Musical instruments: Musical instruments 
Paper and manufactures thereof: Paper manufactures (all sub-industries thereof) 
Rubber and manufactures thereof: India-rubber and gutta percha  
Silk manufactures: Silk factories 
Spirits: Distilleries  






Appendix C. Robustness checks 
 
 
Table C.1.   Robustness checks 




    
Labour intensity  
-0.20*** 
(0.07) 
   





exc. coal and coke 




















Decade fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.04 
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 
Years 1880-1900 1880-1900 1880-1900 1880-1900 1880-1900 
Sources: See text and Appendix B. 
Notes: The dependent variable is the RSCA indicator. All explanatory variables are expressed in 
natural logarithms. Standard errors are noted in parentheses. ** indicates statistical significance at the 
5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
